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A DIAMOND IS FOREVER: DE BEERS, THE
KIMBERLEY PROCESS, AND THE EFFICACY
OF PUBLIC AND CORPORATE CO-
REGULATORY INITIATIVES IN SECURING
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
"Diamonds have always been far more than jewels; they
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INTRODUCTION
As Stefan Kanfer intimates, diamonds have long
been intertwined with the human experience. Indeed,
though many people often associate diamonds with love
and romance,3 the valuable gems have been at the heart of
struggles for power and wealth among national
governments, industry players, and guerrilla fighters.
4
Until recently, 80% of the world's rough diamonds were
under the tight control of De Beers, a multinational
corporation that maintained near dictatorial control over the
world's supply.5 In addition, national governments have
sought diamonds as a lucrative natural resource. Through
policy, governments have tried, with varying levels of
success, to limit the ability of rebel groups and corporations
in order to exercise autonomy over diamonds.
6
However, several significant changes in the
diamond industry have threatened to fundamentally alter
both its structure and the way in which key industry players
3 See University of Arkansas Sociologists Study Why
Americans Covet Deadly, Dazzling Diamonds, ASCRIBE NEWSWIRE,
Feb. 26, 2003.
4 See infra notes 27-64 and accompanying text. See also
GLOBAL WITNESS, CONFLICT DIAMONDS: POSSIBILITIES FOR THE
IDENTIFICATION, CERTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF DIAMONDS 1
(2000).
5 See Rough Diamond Sales Rose 40% in '86, DeBeers Says,
WALL ST. J., May 4, 1987, at 27.
6 See, e.g., infra note 64 and accompanying text (explaining
U.S. efforts to legislate on diamonds).
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conduct business.7 In 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice
indicted De Beers for criminal price fixing of industrial
diamonds. However, the company refused to answer the
charges for ten years, preferring instead to limit its contact
with the U.S.8 Then, in 2000, countries and industry
representatives began adopting the Kimberley Process, an
international certification scheme for diamonds. 9 Members
of the diamond industry, representatives of major diamond
producing nations, and the international community set the
initiative in motion with the purpose of eradicating the use
of diamonds to finance wars.' 0 De Beers later agreed to
comply with Kimberley Process regulations limiting which
diamonds the company would be permitted to buy.'I
In examining these events, it appears the Kimberley
Process has had the ultimate effect of inducing De Beers to
modify some of its corporate practices. 12  The De Beers
case also suggests that heterogeneous regulatory bodies,
which include an aspect of self-regulation, can prove to be
See infra notes 27-96 and accompanying text (discussing
publicity over conflict diamonds, the creation of the Kimberley
Process, and antitrust charges against De Beers).
a See Mark Williams, Plea Deal Clears De Beers to Sell
Diamonds in U.S. Directly Again, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 14, 2004, at
79.
9 See The Diamond Cartel - The Cartel Isn't For Ever, THE
ECONOMIST, July 17, 2004, at 61.
1o See infra notes 35-80 and accompanying text (discussing the
creation of the Kimberley Process).
1 See Kimberley Process: FAQs,
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/?name=faq (last visited
Feb. 28, 2006); World Diamond Council: Membership Information,
http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
12 See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text (discussing
the effectiveness of the Kimberley Process).
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effective in securing regulatory compliance from dominant
multinational corporations.'
3
This Note scrutinizes De Beers's response to the
charges issued by the U.S. and also analyzes how De Beers
responded to the creation of the Kimberley Process. This
Note thereby examines the effectiveness of enhanced self-
regulation schemes in inducing multinational corporations
to alter business practices, particularly when those
businesses operate on a global scale.
Part II will discuss the history of the diamond trade
and De Beers's rise to power within the industry. It will
explore the problem of conflict diamonds and the growth of
the international outcry against the sale of such diamonds
to fund domestic conflicts. Finally, it will explain the
workings of the diamond industry and De Beers's recent
role within it, including the alleged monopolistic practices
and antitrust charges that have been filed.
Part III will examine De Beers's response to
charges issued by the U.S. and to the regulations of the
Kimberley Process. Part III will also suggest that enhanced
self-regulation schemes such as the Kimberley Process may
prove effective in similar industries as a means of altering
the behavior of strong multinational corporations.
Finally Part IV will affirm the Kimberley Process as
an effective method for addressing the conflict diamond
problem. It will also propose that in addition to continuing
its efforts to regulate the workings of the diamond industry,
the Kimberly Process should apply additional scrutiny to
13 See infra notes 106-113 and accompanying text (concluding
that the De Beers example shows that heterogeneous regulatory bodies
can be very effective).
De Beers and the Kimberley Process
ensure that banned diamonds do not enter the market
through illicit channels.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. De Beers and the Diamond Trade
Diamonds were first discovered in India some time
before the 18th century. 14 They were immediately prized
for their sparkling luminescence and their unique property
of reflecting light outward so as to sparkle brilliantly. 5 In
1869, an 83.5-carat diamond, known as the "Star of
Africa," was discovered in South Africa.' 6 From that point
forward, Africa has been one of the world's chief sources
of diamonds.17
14 GODEHARD LENZEN, THE HISTORY OF DIAMOND
PRODUCTION AND THE DIAMOND TRADE I (F. Bradley trans., Barrie
Books Limited 1970) (1966). There is some discussion among
historians over when diamonds were actually discovered. See, e.g., id.
at 1-5.
15 See id. at 13. In fact, from the first century B.C., the
diamond enjoyed prestige arising from its unique hardness that led
some to believe it had the mystical ability to protect those who wore it
from "snakes, fire, poison, disease, thieves, water, and black magic."
Id. at 21.
16 DOUGLAS FARAH, BLOOD FROM STONES: THE SECRET
FINANCIAL NETWORK OF TERROR 21 (2004).
17 See G. Ariovich, The Economics of Diamond Price
Movements, 6 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 234, 236 n.4 (1985);
So-Young Chang, The Global Diamond Industry, CHAZEN WEB J. OF
INT'L BUs. 4 (Fall 2002), available at
http://wwwl .gsb.columbia.edu/joumals/files/chazen/Global-Diamond-
Industry.pdf. In fact, the diamond industry as a whole, including
mining, sorting, cutting, polishing, manufacturing, and retail sectors
employs 28,000 workers in the South African economy. Emma Muller,
Diamond Business in a Huff Over 'Conflict Free' Oscar Freebies,
BUSINESS DAY, March 1, 2005, available at
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200503010253.html.
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Following the discovery of the "Star of Africa,"' 
8
mining companies began to move to the continent in order
to stake their claims over land they hoped would yield large
volumes of rough diamonds. 19 The diamond mining
process was grueling work.20  Before mining technology
had developed on a large scale, companies employed large
numbers of native Africans to work the mines.21 Living
conditions were dismal for the workers as they were kept
closely supervised, and any attempt to smuggle diamonds
out of the mines - a feat that promised more riches than a
lifetime of workinq in the mines ever could - resulted in
severe punishment.
's FARAH, supra note 16, at 21.
19 See LENZEN, supra note 14, at 147 (showing a map of
various diamond mining companies' claims staked at the Kimberley
mine as of 1880).
20 See KANFER, supra note 1, at 42-3 (referring to the situation
of black men working the diamond fields in the late 1800s as
"slavery"). During this time, South Africa developed Pass Laws, which
restricted the movement of black miners and contributed to the
beginning of apartheid in that nation. Id. at 43. The Pass Laws were
instituted on behalf of the diamond companies that had begun to mine
the country and feared that the native miners would steal diamonds and
run away with them. Id. At the same time, mining companies needed
these native workers to do the backbreaking mining work in return for
the low wages. See id; John M. Smalberger, The Role of the Diamond-
Mining Industry in the Development of the Pass-Law System in South
Africa, 9 INT'L J. AFR. HIST. STUD. 419,420 n.3 (1976).
21 James Searing & Robert Tignor, Colonial Africa, in BLACK
HISTORY 6 (Patricia J.F. Rosef et al. eds., 1983).
2 See Smalberger, supra note 20, at 420; KANFER, supra note
1, at 71 (describing the living conditions for mine workers, and African
workers' attempts to smuggle diamonds out of the mines). See also
GREG CAMPBELL, BLOOD DIAMONDS: TRACING THE DEADLY PATH OF
THE WORLD'S MOST PRECIOUS STONES 6-9 (2002) (describing a visit to
a diamond mine and the difficult jobs diggers perform); Many
Countries Show Major Flaws in Diamond Trade Controls, ECON.
NEWS, Oct. 29, 2004 (discussing the dismal conditions in diamond
mines even now, with the average diamond miner in Africa earning $1
De Beers and the Kimberley Process
De Beers, which currently controls a majority of the
world's diamonds,23 began with one ambitious man who
became involved in South African diamond mining in the
1800S.24 The company grew and eventually consolidated
its power to form two parent companies, each with multiple
subsidiaries: De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd.
(incorporated in South Africa), and De Beers Centenary
AG (incorporated in Switzerland).2 5  Both companies
control the Central Selling Organization (CSO), a powerful
marketing arm that also controls the company's rough
diamond sales.
26
Originally, diamonds were reserved for only the
wealthiest individuals.27 However, sales grew steadily as
the gems became more plentiful with the discovery of more
efficient mining technologies and new mines.28 By the end
per day); Diamonds Shine Brighter, But Government Revenues Remain
Dull, INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORKS, Feb. 24, 2005
(discussing the absence of written contracts, enforceable health and
safety regulations, or child labor laws, and estimating that there are
10,000 child dianond miners in the small African nation).
2 See John R. Wilke, DeBeers Is in Talks to Settle Price-
Fixing Charge, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2004, at Al (explaining that as of
2002, DeBeers and its affiliates produce 62% of the world's diamonds).
Controlling diamond production is very lucrative; in 1999 alone, the
world's diamond production for the year was valued at $6.8 billion.
GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 4, at 3.
24 See LENZEN, supra note 14, at 154-5.
25 Dale J. Montpelier, Comment, Diamonds are Forever?
Implications of United States Antitrust Statutes on International Trade
and the De Beers Diamond Cartel, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 277, 285-8
(1994).
26 1d. at 288.27University of Texas, Mineral Lore and Mythology,
http://www.tmm.utexas.edu/npl/mineralogyALoreandMythology/inde
x.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2006). Cf GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 4,
at 2 ("Diamonds are one of the most concentrated forms of wealth
known to man.").
n See Bryson Burke Diamond Corporation, The Story of
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of the 19th century, diamonds were commonly seen on
engagement rings and in other forms of jewelry owned by
the the upper-middle class.2 9 Now, partially as a result of
De Beers's marketing efforts, diamonds are in high demand
worldwide as jewels.30  In fact, De Beers's advertising
Indicator Minerals - History,
http://brysonburke.com/indicator-minerals-history.html (last visited
Feb. 28, 2006). See Harriet Kelsall Jewellery Design, Engagement
Rings history,
http:l/www.hkjewellery.co.uk/default.asp?Page=engagementrings-
history (last visited Feb. 28, 2006). At their point of origin, diamonds
are in a "rough" state and scarcely resemble the sparkling jewels most
people envision. See LENZEN, supra note 14, at Fig. 1. After a
diamond has been mined, it is sold to a buyer and goes through the
process of being cut and polished, jobs that are completed by separate
experts in each task. See also id at 75-81 (describing diamond origins
and the cutting process). By the time a diamond reaches a jewelry store
display case, it has undergone a significant transformation and changed
hands multiple times. CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 111-2. As
diamonds change hands, their price increases dramatically; the final
price of a finished, polished diamond can be up to 100 times the price
paid for the diamond at its source. Id. See also GLOBAL WITNESS,
supra note 4, at 4 (explaining the diamond trading process in depth);
Ariovich, supra note 17 (examining the factors involved in diamond
pricing). 2
29 See Francesca Carnevali, Golden Opportunities: Jewelry
Making in Birmingham Between Mass Production and Specialty, 4
ENTERPRISE & SOcIETY 272, 287-8 (2003).
30 See CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 112-3. In the U.S.,
diamonds play an important cultural and symbolic role largely due to
De Beers marketing. De Beers first employed NW Ayer & Partners, an
advertising agency, to market diamonds as a necessary part-of every
engagement ring in 1939. Sharda Prashad, Why Diamonds Are a Girl's
Best Friend, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 23, 2005, at D12. "De Beers
manipulated romance," one journalist suggested, "[b]ut the strategy
worked." Id. Today there are very few engagement rings that do not
include a diamond of some size, which has come to be an expectation.
Id. As of 2004, 82% of engagement rings were made with diamonds,
and 85% of newly engaged women were presented with a diamond
engagement ring. Id. Advertisements selling diamond jewelry often
allude to the diamond's role in the "mating game," with slogans
De Beers and the Kimberley Process
served as the driving force behind the creation of the post-
World War II cultural norm in Germany and Japan of
diamond engagement rings. 31 Prior to World War II, less
than 1% of Japanese citizens had diamonds on their
wedding rings, but following De Beers's advertising efforts
after the war, 70% of new engagement rings contained
diamonds. 2 Furthermore, German wedding rings had not
traditionally contained diamonds until De Beers introduced
a kind of wedding ring with diamonds in the late 1960s,
after which German diamond consumption grew
dramatically. 33  In addition to their marketability as
jewelry, a market has emerged for the use of diamonds as
industrial tools, which can best be attributed to gems' rare
hardness.
34
B. Conflict Diamonds and the Creation of the
Kimberley Process
The phrase "conflict diamonds," refers to
"diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or
factions opposed to legitimate and internationally
recognized governments, and are used to fund military
action in opposition to those governments, or in
targeted toward men, such as "Only her ears need enhancing," and "Of
course there's a return on your investment. We just can't print it here."
Christine Bittar, De Beers Plays Up Details, Diamonds in Ad Push,
BRANDWEEK, Nov. 20, 2000, at 10. Recently, De Beers has developed
a new marketing campaign that expands the target audience for buying
diamond rings. De Beers's new advertisements encourage single
women to buy a diamond ring for their right hands, dubbing it a "right-
hand" ring. Prashad, supra at D12. Advertisements encourage, "Your
left hand says 'we.' Your right hand says 'me.' Women of the world,
raise your right hand." Id.
31 KANFER, supra note 1, at 7.32 id.
33id.
34 Id at 23.
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contravention of the decisions of the UN Security
Council. 35 Conflict diamonds have been at the center of at
least two brutal African wars3 6 in which rebel groups
fought for control over their governments and gained
territory in diamond-rich areas.3 ' After gaining control,
rebels then attempted to smuggle rough diamonds out of
the country and sell them to buyers through other countries
in order to finance their wars with the profits.38
The trade in conflict diamonds has proven harmful
to the countries and citizens where such diamonds
originate. 39  Not only do conflict diamonds sustain the
groups that threaten to undermine legitimate governments,
33 Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War,
http://www.un.org/peace/africaf/Diamond.html (last visited Feb. 28,
2006). See also FARAH, supra note 16, at 4; Dick Durham, Diamond
Trade Fuels Bloody Wars,
http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/africa/01/1 8/diamonds.o
verview/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
36 Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, supra note 35.
37 See infra notes 41-5 and accompanying text. Although
much of this Note refers to the negative consequences of the diamond
trade, not all of De Beers's involvement with such African nations has
been harmful. For example, DeBeers's presence in Botswana has
enabled it to dictate HIV/AIDS prevention policies. Martha L.
Salomon, Note, AIDS is Risky Business: Examining the Effect of the
AIDS Crisis on Publicly Traded Companies in South Africa and the
Implications for Both South African and US. Investors, 37 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1473, 1475 (2004) (explaining in that nation, De Beers
has refused to complete contracts with small business owners locally
unless they demonstrate that they have incorporated an intensive
HIV/AIDS policy into their workplaces).
38 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1306, 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July
5, 2000); S.C. Res. 1295, 18, N.C. Doc. S/RES1295 (April 18, 2000);
S.C. Res. 1195, 81, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1195 (Dec. 19, 2000)
(suggesting that the RUF smuggles most of its diamonds out of Sierra
Leone through Liberia). Rebel armies use diamonds to "buy arms and
munitions, to pay and feed troops and to keep strategic alliances alive."
GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 4, at 2.39 See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 9.
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the trade has led to atrocities against residents of villages
located near the valuable diamond mines that rebel groups
have sought control over.40 For example, in Sierra Leone,
the rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF) incited a
war in 1991 and used diamond mining as a crucial source
of income.4 1 During that period, the RUF controlled the
richest diamond-producing areas in the nation42 and
terrorized local communities by methodically amputatinA
limbs for the purpose of dispelling the native populations.
In Angola, rebels of the Uniao Nacional Para a
Independ~ncia Total de Angola (UNITA) fought a civil war
with the government for two decades before reaching a
shaky peace agreement in 1994. 4 However, UNITA was
reluctant to uphold its agreement to relinquish control over
the Cuango Valley, the country's diamond-rich region
traditionally exploited for its diamond resources for the
purpose of financing the group's military operations.45
40 See Durham, supra note 35.
41 S.C. Res. 1295, supra note 38, at 16; GLOBAL WITNESS,
supra note 4, at 2. Conflict diamonds represent "a major and primary
source of income for the RUF." FARAH, supra note 16, at 33. See also
CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 22-3 (explaining that even during the
most dangerous times of the RUF conflict, diamond merchants
continued to buy from RUF rebels, and smuggling continued). In part
because of the diamonds it illegally mined, the RUF was able to
generate $3.7 billion over six years in the 1990s to finance its
operations. GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 4, at 2.
42 S.C. Res. 1306, supra note 38, at 17.
43 See CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at xiii-xiv (describing the
RUF's method of chopping off of civilians' hands). See also
CAMPBELL, supra note 22, for a history of conflict over diamonds in
Sierra Leone, particularly between the government and the RUF.
4 Robert Block, Angolan Foes in Talks to Split Diamond
Industry, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1997, at A15.
4' Id. See generally S.C. Res. 1295, supra note 38. One
estimate suggests that there have been as many as 400,000 illicit
diamond miners in Angola in the last 12 years, and that UNITA
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The trade in conflict diamonds has had numerous
adverse effects on the countries in which they originate.
Rebels who traffic conflict diamonds deny their native
country some of its most valuable natural resources.
Impoverished nations are thereby precluded the opportunity
to tax proceeds from diamond sales which could otherwise
be utilized to build infrastructure and provide for citizens'
basic needs.46 Additionally, the sale of conflict diamonds
has been attributed to terrorist organizations - most
notably, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas - to support their
activities, highlighting another of their troublesome uses.
brought many of them into the country. GLOBAL WITNESS &
PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, THE KEY TO KIMBERLEY INTERNAL
DIAMOND CONTROLS: SEVEN CASE STUDIES 5 (2004).
4 See, e.g., Muller, supra note 17 (explaining that nations
whose diamond trade is largely legitimate use revenues from diamond
sales to fund HIV/AIDS initiatives, health care, and education for their
populations). Additionally, legitimate diamond mining and the entire
diamond finishing process can provide employment opportunities for
these nations and their citizens. See also id. (citing diamond mining
and production as a key employer in South Africa and Botswana, and
crediting a Botswana mining conglomerate, partly owned by De Beers,
as enabling Botswana to "transform itself from an undeveloped
agriculture-based economy to one of the most successful in the
world"); Diamonds Shine Brighter, supra note 22 (estimating that
between $30 million and $170 million worth of diamonds exited Sierra
Leone illegally during 2004, and explaining that the government
receives very little in tax revenue from the diamonds that pass through
it).
47See CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at xxv; Michael Maggi, Note,
The Currency of Terrorism: An Alternative Way to Combat Terrorism
and End the Trade of Conflict Diamonds, 15 PACE INT'L L. REV. 513,
514 (2003). See also FARAH, supra note 16, at 1-8 (describing
diamonds as a source of income for Osama bin Laden's terrorist
network and explaining how money from the sale of conflict diamonds
thwarted the U.S.'s attempts after September 11, 2001 to disable
terrorists' financial network).
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Difficulty in identifying and tracing conflict
diamonds is one major reason why they have proliferated.48
Tom Shane, an American diamond importer, explained,
"[y]ou take a diamond that's been cut and polished and
there's no human being on earth who can tell with certainty
where that stone came from.' 4 9  The difficulty in
deciphering the origin of such diamonds has plagued the
international community in its attempts to address the
conflict diamond problem.
50
After many years of inaction, the international
community finally got involved.5' Several international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including Global
Witness and Partnership Africa, adopted the conflict
diamond issue as a part of their agenda, and began
pressuring the diamond industry to enact measures that
would eliminate the use of conflict diamonds. 52  These
efforts induced both industry members and regulatory
48 See Sean D. Murphy, US. Legislation in Support of
Diamonds Controls, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 485, 485 n.2 (2002). See, e.g.,
Maggi, supra note 47, at 525-6. But see GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note
4, at 7-14 (suggesting that it is possible to identify the general area of a
diamond's origin, discussing at length the current status of attempts to
identify a diamonds' source, and describing some scientific methods
for identification).
49 See CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 122. Campbell suggests,
"[d]iamonds are so portable-and their value so enticing-that no
system of certificates will ever be able to answer, for certain, whether
or not the diamonds in an engagement ring came from perfectly
legitimate sources in South Africa or from under the tongue of an RUF
rebel called Colonel Poison." Id. at 133.
" Robert Block, You Can Learn a Lot About a Diamond if You
Smash it Up, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2000, at Al.
51 See, e.g., Global Witness, http://www.globalwitness.org
(last visited Feb. 28, 2006); Partnership Africa Canada,
http://www.africa-ata.org/canadajpac.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).52 Id; Many Countries Show Major Flaws in Diamond Trade
Controls, supra note 22.
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bodies to take action to address conflict diamond
proliferation.5 3 The first efforts began when the Diamond
High Council, a nonprofit organization representing the
Belgian diamond industry, 54 sought to create transparency
in diamond origins by requiring that diamond importers list
the place where each imported diamond was mined.
55
However, this requirement proved ineffective. As reported
by a UN panel of experts in 2000 examining the imports for
a company moving goods between Liberia and Belgium,
"diamonds far in excess of the quality or quantity available
in Liberia had been imported as Liberian in province and in
origin."56 These findings indicated that, in fact, the
reporting requirements for importing nations had not
stopped the flow of diamonds through illegal streams of
commerce.
57
Beginning in the 1990s, the UN Security Council, in
an attempt to stem the conflict diamond trade, issued
several resolutions denouncing diamonds purchased from
African rebel groups known to be involved in the conflict
diamond trade.5 In 1998, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1173, which sanctioned diamonds from
Angolan rebels,5 9 and also adopted Resolution 1176, which
sanctioned diamonds from the RUF.6 ° In 2000, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1306, which banned
53 See CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 126-29.
54 See Gendiat: The Diamond High Council,
http://www.diamondmanufacturer.com/tutorial/council.ht (last visited
Feb. 28, 2006).
55 See CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 125.56 S.C. Res. 1195, supra note 38, at 125.
57 See id. The UN surmised that these excess diamonds may
have been smuggled into Liberia via Sierra Leone and were actually
conflict diamonds originating with the rebel group RUF. See id.
58 See CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 130.
9 S.C. Res. 1173, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1 173 (June 12, 1998).
60 S.C. Res. 1176, U.N. DOC. S/RES/i 176 (June 24, 1998).
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countries from importing any rough diamonds from Sierra
Leone until a certification process was put into place.
61
Likewise, in 2001, the diamond industry responded to
pressures from the UN and NGOs by creating the World
Diamond Council in Belgium, an organization mandated to
speak on behalf of the diamond industry and work with the
UN on the conflict diamond issue.62  Lawmakers from
individual nations also joined the effort to eliminate
conflict diamonds.63 In fact, within the U.S.,, several
Congressmen introduced legislation in 2001 to ensure that
all diamonds imported to the U.S. were "clean."
' '
Though the efforts of the diamond industry, the UN,
and individual nations were well-intentioned, it soon
became apparent that they were failing, and that more
comprehensive measures were needed to stem the
proliferation of conflict diamonds. 65  Human rights
organizations, the UN, the World Bank, and policymakers
from individual nations continued to pressure the diamond
industry to hold itself accountable for regulating the
sources of its diamonds. 66  In response to the mounting
61 S.C. Res. 1306, supra note 38.
62 CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 130.
63 See, e.g., FARAH, supra note 16, at 104-07.
64 See CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 129-30. In 2001,
Congressman Tony Hall and Senator Judd Gregg introduced the Clean
Diamond Act. Id. The bill passed in the House but was never brought
to a vote in the Senate. FARAH, supra note 16, at 106. Interestingly, in
2001, the diamond industry spent $2 million lobbying Congress, the
same year in which the Act was introduced. Id See generally Murphy,
supra note 48 (discussing the international community and U.S.
lawmakers' legislative, response to the role diamonds played in the
armed conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone).
65 See CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 130 (positing that, based
on the author's own personal observations in Sierra Leone and
discussions with rebel leaders, the legislative measures enacted had
virtually no effect on RUF's diamond smuggling activities).
6 Block, You Can Learn a Lot About a Diamond if You Smash
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pressure, the diamond industry joined the UN and
governments of diamond-producing nations to form a self-
regulating mechanism known as the Kimberley Process.
67
South Africa, a nation whose diamond industry is
one of the world's largest, first organized the Kimberley
Process in May 2000. Key players from the diamond
industry, UN representatives, and stakeholding national
governments met in Kimberley, South Africa to discuss
various plans for eliminating the conflict diamond trade.
69
A set of regulations, now known as the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme, or KPCS, emerged.70
It Up, supra note 50, at Al.
67 See The Diamond Cartel - The Cartel Isn't For Ever, supra
note 9, at 61.
68 CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 130; GLOBAL WITNESS, supra
note 4, at 3; Polishing a Rough Diamond,
http://www.southafrica.info/doingbusiness/economy/keysectors/diam
onds-report2004.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) ("South Africa's
world-class mining sector forms the cornerstone of its economy.").
69 See CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 130-32 (describing the
various plans that were suggested in the discussions on how to
accomplish the Kimberley Process's goal, including branding rough
diamonds with lasers at their mines of origin, and creating an
international database of chemical and physical properties of diamonds
from locations where they are found). See also GLOBAL WITNESS,
supra note 4, at 120-25 (outlining other potential methods and
technolo§ies for diamond identification).
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme,
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/?name=kpcs (last visited
Feb. 28, 2006). However, the conflict diamond issue has been
addressed in ways other than the Kimberley Process's certification
scheme. Key diamond industry players have become involved in other
efforts to stop the illegal trade of diamonds. For example, the Rapaport
Group (an international network of companies trading diamonds),
Global Witness (an NGO working on the conflict diamond issue), and
the U.S. Agency for International Development (an American agency
providing foreign assistance) have formed a diggers' cooperative in
Sierra Leone that aims to pay workers a fair price for diamonds they
De Beers and the Kimberley Process
The Kimberley Process requires that each diamond
be accompanied from its point of origin by a certificate
stating its place of mining, and further prohibits any
industry member or nation from purchasing or importing
any diamond lacking a certificate affirming that it is
"clean." 71 The Kimberley Process is particularly significant
in that it combines aspects of self-regulation with UN and
individual nations' assistance to form its decision-making
and enforcement processes.72 This heterogeneous body can
be described as a combination of "public and corporate co-
regulation" and improves upon the traditional self-
regulating bodies that only included industry players.73 De
Beers, as an industry representative and member of the
Kimberley Process, has pledged to abide by the
find. Clayton Collins, When Bullets Fly, Some Firms Swoop In,
CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, Dec. 27, 2004, at 13. Efforts such as this
have been lauded as enterprising and even brave, as nations like Sierra
Leone are still in an uncertain conflict or post-conflict state that
discourages most companies from investing. Id. However, such
cooperatives aim not only to make profits, but also to improve the
quality of life of the average diamond worker. Id. While still young,
such initiatives could prove to augment the Kimberley Process by
providing capital and employment in war-tom areas to help those
nations rebuild their economies. Id.
71 See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra note 70.
But see CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 132-33 (suggesting that the
Kimberley Process plan for diamond certification may be unworkable
because it will require unrealistic organization and honesty, and
predicting, for example, low-paid customs officials in Sierra Leone
may be easily bribed in the certification process).
7 The Diamond Cartel - The Cartel Isn't For Ever, supra note
9, at 61; Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra note 70.
73 See JUDrrH RICHTER, HOLDING CORPORATIONS
ACCOUNTABLE: CORPORATE CoNDUCr, INTERNATIONAL CODES, AND
CITIZEN ACTION 40 (2001) (defining "public and corporate co-
regulation" as "regulatory arrangements between industry and
government authorities or UN agencies").
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certification rules that prohibit it from purchasing any
diamond without a certificate ensuring it is conflict-free.74
While the Kimberley Process officially began in
2002,75 and its long-term success is still somewhat
speculative, one recent event suggests that this process of
enhanced self-regulation may at least be more effective
than previous efforts.76  In July 2004, the Kimberley
Process affirmed its pledge to "[p]rotect the legitimate
diamond industry" by expelling Congo-Brazzaville from its
ranks.77 The expulsion followed a Kimberley Process
committee's discovery that the country's diamond exports
far exceeded the number of diamonds that could
legitimately be mined by way of legal, conflict-free
sources. 78 Expulsion has serious implications for Congo-
Brazzaville, a country that relies heavily on diamond
exportation. Expulsion requires that "no shipment of rough
diamonds [be] imported from or exported to a non-
Participant," which would effectively prohibit the world's
main diamond importing nations from legally purchasing
Congo-Brazzaville diamonds. 79  This action has been
74 See Collins, supra note 70; see also Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme, supra note 70. Before the institution of the
Kimberley Process, De Beers had achieved record levels of sales in
1996 and boasted that increased profits were due to purchases in
Angola. CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 113-14. However, this occurred
during a period of intense fighting between UNITA rebels and the
Angolan government, at which time UNITA controlled 70% of the
diamond market. Id. See also id, at 122 ("The diamond industry knew
all along where some of its stones were coming from....").
71 See U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Annex 8, Agenda Item 37, at
16, U.N. Doc. A/56/775 (Jan. 17, 2002); Maggi, supra note 47, at 531.
76 See infra notes 77-9 and accompanying text.
77 U.N. GAOR, supra note 75, at 3.
78 See The Diamond Cartel - The Cartel Isn't For Ever, supra
note 9, at 61. See also Congo-Brazzaville,
http://eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/congo.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
7 Congo-Brazzaville, supra note 78; List of Participants,
De Beers and the Kimberley Process
lauded as a "test case for the [diamond] industry,"80 as it
indicates that the Kimberley Process not only has a
regulatory function but also an enforcement mechanism
that it will not hesitate to implement when necessary.
C. Antitrust Charges and De Beers's Reaction
Through the careful manipulation of other industry
players and gradual purchasing of diamond interests
internationally, De Beers has grown to control most of the
world's diamond supply.81 Some have classified De Beers
as an international cartel,82 as it certainly exhibits many of
the characteristics of one.8 3  In fact, De Beers's tight
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/?name=participants (last
visited Feb. 28, 2006).
so The Diamond Cartel - The Cartel Isn't For Ever, supra note
9, at 61. In fact, evidence indicates that Congo-Brazzaville may be
taking its expulsion from the KPCS quite seriously. In August 2004,
Congo-Brazzaville's president Denis Sassou Nguesso announced
measures to overhaul the diamond trade in his country. Nguesso's New
Tack on Diamonds, AFRICA MINING INTELLIGENCE, Sept. 1, 2004, at
91.
81 See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE COOPERATIVE EDGE: THE
INTERNAL POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 42 (1994); Rough
Diamond Sales Rose 40% in '86, DeBeers Says, supra note 5, at 27.
De Beers became a private company in 2001; the Oppenheimer family
owns 45%, Anglo American PLC owns 45%, and Debswana owns
10%. See Wilke, De Beers is in Talks, supra note 23, at Al.
82 Professor Spar has identified De Beers as the leading
member of the diamond cartel. She explains that the cartel's strategy is
characteristic of all cartels: restricting the quantity of an item
(diamonds) released into the market and thereby maintaining the
illusion of diamonds as a scarce resource. SPAR, supra note 81, at 41.
8 See SPAR, supra note 81, at 39-87. International cartels
have an effect that victimizes consumers around the globe. James M.
Griffin, An Inside Look At A Cartel At Work: Common Characteristics
of International Cartels, American Bar Association, Section of
Antitrust Law, 4 8th Annual Spring Meeting, Omni Shoreham Hotel,
Washington, D.C., at 15 (April 6, 2000).
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control over diamond supply and demand 8provides
persuasive evidence of its resemblance to a cartel.
De Beers controls the world's diamond supply by
buying most of the world's rough diamonds and stockpiling
them in its London warehouse. ! The corporation then sells
only enough diamonds to meet demand (a strategy which
arguably has continued throughout the years); when
demand goes up, De Beers increases the price. 6 De Beers
further seeks to restrict diamond sales by selling only a
limited number of diamonds to preferred customers through
a process shrouded in secrecy and known as "selling
sights."87 Through this process, De Beers selects buyers,
limits the quantity it will sell to each, determines the
diamonds' quality, and sets the price.88  The buyers may
either accept or decline the entire grouping of diamonds
they are offered.8 9 De Beers does not permit negotiation,
and in practice, no buyer refuses.
90
De Beers's impact on the market is also evident
through its heavy involvement in diamond marketing
84 See SPAR, supra note 81, at 52-6.
"' See id. at 54-6.
86 See LENZEN, supra note 14, at 192; Rough Diamond Sales
Rose 40% in '86, De Beers Says, supra note 5, at 27 (explaining that
De Beers raises prices when the demand for diamonds goes up, even
though the corporation will not publicly admit this). See also LENZEN,
supra note 14, at 200 (describing how the Syndicate controls both the
price of rough diamonds on the closed market, and the price of rough
diamonds on the free market).
87 See SPAR, supra note 81, at 54-55.
ss See id. at 55.
s' See id.
90 See LENZEN, supra note 14, at 200-201 (describing De
Beers's practice of selling "sights" to only a limited number of very
high-powered buyers). See also KANFER, supra note 1, at 3-4
(describing the ritual and secrecy of a "sight" distribution, and the fate
of one sightholder who refused to buy what De Beers was offering).
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through the CSO. The corporation's emphasis on
marketing is so pervasive that it has had a significant
impact on the worldwide demand for diamonds as
jewelry.91 The CSO spends roughly $200 million each year
on diamond marketing92 and is responsible for the famous
advertising campaign, "a diamond is forever," one of the
most successful marketing slogans in history.
93
De Beers's tight grip on the diamond market has led
to accusations, dating as far back as 1945, that the company
violated U.S. antitrust laws.94 De Beers first ceased direct
91 See The Diamond Cartel - The Cartel Isn't For Ever, supra
note 9, at 62 ("Consumers believe diamonds are valuable largely
because of decades of clever marketing by De Beers and its clients.").
De Beers's marketing arm is also powerful enough to spark business
moves by other industry competitors. See Melanie Kletter, An Industry
in Transition, WOMENSWEAR DAILY, Jan. 27, 2003, at 6 (identifying
De Beers as the impetus for diamond suppliers' move to marketing
their own branded diamonds, as well as crediting the company with
driving the record sales of three-stone diamond jewelry in the 2002
holiday season).
92 FARAH, supra note 16, at 21.
93 See Top 10 Slogans, ADVERTISING AGE, March 29, 1999
(lauding De Beers's famous slogan as the most effective slogan of the
20th century). See also Barry Kaplan, Forever Diamonds,
http://www.jewelry-paideia.com/reference/ref-diamond-jewelry-2.php
(last visited Feb. 28, 2006) (discussing De Beers's successful
advertising).
See Dustin Dwyer, Diamond in the Rough: Why U.S. Should
Let in DeBeers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 15, 2004, at A15. See also
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004); 1-2 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, ET. AL.,
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 2.01 (Matthew Bender &
Co., Inc., 2d ed. 2005). The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission have dual authority to enforce antitrust laws. See
ANTITRUST § 76.01 The basis for applying American antitrust law to
entities such as DeBeers that were technically based beyond U.S.
borders (DeBeers is based in South Africa and Switzerland) originally
rested on the "territorial principle," which allows a state sovereignty
over acts that occur outside its territory when the effects reach into the
state. See Walter Siegl, International Courts Before American Courts:
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operations inside the U.S. just after World War II when the
U.S. Department of Justice brought antitrust charges
against the corporation for 'conspiring to restrict
production, monopolize sales and arbitrarily inflate prices
of 95 percent of the world output of gem and industrial
diamonds.'9 5  As a large, multinational corporation, De
Beers was easily able to relocate its operations to other
countries. By leaving the U.S., De Beers was able to both
escape the reach of U.S. law enforcement and ignore the
charges from a safe distance at its two main corporate bases
in Switzerland and South Africa.
96
In 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice
again issued charges against De Beers, alleging that the
corporation had entered into a criminal conspiracy in the
early 1990's with General Electric Co. The Department of
Justice investigations unearthed evidence that De Beers had
conspired with General Electric Co. to raise the list prices
of industrial diamonds worldwide in violation of the
Sherman Act,97 resulting in the two companies together
The Issue of International Jurisdiction 18-20 (1965) (unpublished
Master of Laws thesis, Tulane University) (explaining the territorial
principle as a basis for charges against international cartels). The
territorial principle was refined to an effects-based test in one Supreme
Court case where the Court explained that the Sherman Act and U.S.
antitrust law apply only to "foreign conduct that was meant to produce
and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States."
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
95 See Wilke, De Beers is in Talks, supra note 23, at Al. See
Dwyer, supra note 94, at A15.
CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 117; Wilke,De Beers is in
Talks, supra note 23, at Al. However, reentering the U.S. market will
likely put the company back under the scrutiny of the Department of
Justice and it will require the company to take care not to tread on U.S.
antitrust laws. See generally Montpelier, supra note 25 (providing a
more detailed analysis of U.S. antitrust law and how De Beers has been
particularly affected).
15 U.S.C. § 1.
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controlling 80% of the world market for industrial
diamonds. 98 Both companies were indicted, though De
Beers again ignored the charges and avoided direct contact
with the U.S. by remaining outside the country and
accessing U.S. diamond customers through middlemen.
99
The U.S. government has clearly expressed its
opinion regarding the legality of some of De Beers's past
practices; even the fact that the Department of Justice, in its
discretion, chose to level criminal sanctions against the
company rather than a civil alternative indicates the
seriousness with which the government views De Beers's
antitrust violations.1°°  Historically, the Department of
Justice's Antitrust Division has only used criminal
indictments for antitrust violations in cases involving
"agreements among competitors to fix prices, rig bids, or
allocate customers and territories."' 0'1 Therefore, if De
Beers wishes to reenter the U.S. market in a visible way, it
9s Indictment, United States v. General Electric Company,
1994. See also William M. Carley, Fired Officer Who Accused GE of a
Plot to Fix Diamond Prices Drops Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1994,
at A2 (describing how antitrust allegations started with a former
General Electric employee who, incidentally, retracted his statements
against the company just before the trial started); DeBeers Sees Sales
Drop Because of the Recession, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1992 (explaining
the Department of Justice's allegations against De Beers). General
Electric also came under fire from its shareholders for allegedly
conspiring with De Beers, who was its leading industrial diamond
competitor at the time, to eliminate competition. See General Electric
Co. v. Welch, 12/30/92 N.Y.L.J. 27 (Dec. 30, 1992).
99 See 2 JAMES ATWOOD ET AL., ANTITRUST & AM. Bus.
ABROAD § 15:3 (3d ed. 2004) (referring to this case as "[a]n early
example of renewed assertiveness of the Justice Department in [the
area of bringing criminal charges for antitrust violations]").
0o See Siegl, supra note 93, at 13.
""David H. Marks, Anti-Trust Enforcement in the US., in
INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TRUST LAW 162-63 (Julian Maitland-Walker
ed. 1984).
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will not only be subject to U.S. laws (which previously
prohibited De Beers's monopolistic conduct), but also the
enforcement of those laws.1
0 2
Avoiding U.S. contact was of no small
consequence, as the U.S. constitutes one of the largest
diamond-consuming nations in the world. 10 3 In July 2004,
De Beers fimally answered the 1994 charges, ending what
one reporter referred to as a "60-year-long-impasse."'
10 4
The company quietly paid $10 million in a U.S. federal
court to settle the matter, stating with obvious concern,
"[t]he U.S. is the biggest market for diamond jewelry -
accounting for 50% of global retail jewelry sales - and we




102 Siegl, supra note 93, at 18-20.
'03 See Wilke, De Beers is in Talks, supra note 23, at Al. The
international diamond industry is a $6 billion/year industry and the
market sells 50% of its diamonds to American consumers; see
generally CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at xx.
'04 The Diamond Cartel - The Cartel Isn't For Ever, supra
note 9, at 60. Compare United States Department of Justice, DeBeers
Centenary AG Pleads Guilty to Price-Fixing Indictment,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press releases/2004/204592.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2006) (U.S. Department of Justice press release
announcing De Beers decision to plead guilty), with DeBeers
Centenary AG, DeBeers Reaches Settlement With U.S. Department of
Justice, http://www.debeersgroup.com/NR/rdonlyres/F3D020E7-
99ED-4DDE-9E6E-CC3569B65FC5/161/MR200407131 .pdf (last
visited Feb. 28, 2006) (De Beers press release announcing company's
decision to plead guilty).
105 Wilke, De Beers is in Talks, supra note 23, at Al
(emphasis added).
De Beers and the Kimberley Process
The recent growth of corporations in the
international sphere has led to new questions regarding how
they fit in with. laws and regulations promulgated by
national governments and international bodies.
106
Traditionally, businesses remained domestic, allowing
national governments to regulate the business entities
within their borders. However, an increase in global
commerce has meant that it may no longer be beneficial for
businesses to confine themselves within national borders.
Instead, many businesses operate within multiple countries
where they may be subject to a web of differing laws and
regulations. 10 7 Scholars generally agree that there exists a
need to regulate multinational corporations.' 0 8 However,
theorists have not yet reached a consensus as to how
regulations should be promulgated and enforced in the
global market. 1
09
Self-regulation in particular has emerged in recent
years as one viable alternative to external regulation, as it
gives industries the opportunity to control the regulation
process."10  Proponents argue that it helps avoid the
106 JUDITH RICHTER, HOLDING CORPORATIONS ACCOUNTABLE:
CORPORATE CONDUCT, INTERNATIONAL CODES, AND CITIZEN AcTION 8
(2001).
107 See Virginia Haufler, Globalization and Industry Self-
Regulation, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL
AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION 227-8 (Miles Kahler & David A. Lake eds.,
2003). The UN addressed this problem in 1999 when it stated,
"[m]ultinational corporations are already a dominant part of the global
economy - yet many of their actions go unrecorded and unaccounted..
. They need to be brought within a frame of global governance, not just
a patchwork of national laws, rules and regulations." RICHTER, supra
note 106, at 14.
1o8 See RICHTER, supra note 106, at 18, 24.
109 Id. at 11. See, e.g., id. at 22 (discussing several sources
suggesting that self-regulation is insufficient and international
regulations are needed).
110 See VIRGNIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE
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tendency of multinational corporations to move their
businesses to countries with weaker regulations, and that it
provides an opportunity to balance the interests of businessand society without excessive government intervention in
the economy."' Two ideas have perpetuated the trend
toward self-regulation: 1) a growing sense of corporate
responsibility, evidenced by industry codes, suggests that
external regulation may no longer be necessary, and 2) the
increased power of transnational corporations is such that
external regulation may no longer be plausible.12
However, self-regulation has also been criticized by some
who argue that regulations promulgated by industries or
companies themselves are weak and essentially
unenforceable. 113
B. The Kimberley Process and its Effects on De Beers
Professor Virginia Haufler theorizes that companies
are more likely to choose to participate in self-regulatory
schemes when there is a risk of national or international
regulation, when pressure from international activists
affects the company's reputation, or when reputation is an
important asset of the industry or corporation. 114  De
SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 15-19
(2001).
"'. Id. at 2, 4.
112 RICHTER, supra note 106, at 31.
113 See HAUFLER, supra note 110, at 2.
114 HAUFLER, supra note 110, at 3, 106-8. Organizations like
the UN and NGOs like Global Witness are charged with the explicit
task of creating laws that protect citizens, promote fairness, and ensure
smooth trade and market stability so naturally, international regulatory
bodies such as the UN would support public and corporate co-
regulatory bodies such as the Kimberley Process. See, e.g., Global
Witness, http://www.globalwitness.org (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
However, it may be difficult to understand why a multinational
corporation like De Beers, who had grown accustomed to a high level
of self-determination, would choose to adopt such a process, knowing
De Beers and the Kimberley Process
Beers's choice to participate in the Kimberley Process's
public and corporate -co-regulatory scheme is best
explained in light of the convergence of these factors,
particularly the diamond industry's reliance on its
reputation. 15 The negative publicity, generated by NGOs
and surrounding the conflict diamond issue, had threatened
to tarnish diamonds' crystal clear image as symbols of love
and romance. The company was in no position to allow
public outcry or a possible boycott to affect its
reputation.1 1 6 Had De Beers refused to adopt the process, it
would have risked association with the bloody wars that the
conflict diamond trade has perpetuated. 
7
C. U.S. Antitrust Charges
Although the Kimberley Process was aimed at
reducing the conflict diamond trade, it has had the
that it would necessarily involve the presence of industry outsiders in
the regulation process. SPAR, supra note 81, at 42. In fact, the
Kimberley Process was likely a threat to De Beers's autonomy, as the
company previously relied on a lack of transparency in its practices in
order to increase its profits through purchasing conflict diamonds.
CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 113-4.
1:5 See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
116 The Diamond Cartel - The Cartel Isn't For Ever, supra
note 9, AT 61. See also Haufler, supra note 110, AT 3, 26-27.
117 See id.; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 115-16, 208-
09 (indicating that diamond industry leaders participated in Kimberley
Process talks out of fear of a public backlash that would forever taint
the idea of diamonds as symbols of love and romance). However,
evidence indicates that the negative publicity has not affected
consumers' demand for diamonds as jewelry. See id at 209. Tom
Shane, American diamond importer, has said that customers appear
oblivious to the issue of conflict diamonds: "Even with all the articles
that have been written, we don't hear it in our stores being raised as an
issue." Id In fact, author Greg Campbell suggests that De Beers may
have managed to use the conflict diamond issue to its advantage by
addressing the problem and then by adopting a process by which it
ensures that all De Beers diamonds are clean. See id. at 134.
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additional and unintended effect of loosening De Beers's
grip on the diamond industry. As a result of the
introduction of the Kimberley Process's public and
corporate co-regulation, De Beers has been required to
overhaul its business practices. This rethinking of
corporate strategies culminated in De Beers's decision to
ultimately answer ten-year-old criminal charges in the
United States. 1 8 A consulting firm that reviewed the
corporation's business strategy recommended that it
abandon its current practice of controlling rough diamond
supply, 19 suggesting that the company instead market its
diamonds as the premier diamonds in the luxury goods
market. 120  De Beers has since significantly reduced its
London stockpile,' 2 1 pled guilty to charges of price fixing
(thereby positioning itself for a more direct marketing role
in the U.S.), and entered into an agreement with a luxury
goods company to market its diamonds.
22
" Wilke, De Beers is in Talks, supra note 23, at Al. One De
Beers representative stated, "it was apparent by 2000 that diamonds
were beginning to lose out to other luxury goods. Our sales were flat,
and other luxury goods were taking off." Id. See also id ("The review
concluded that a transformation of De Beers into a luxury-goods
company would require a direct presence in the U.S. and a brand name
unfettered by antitrust charges or 'conflict' diamonds."). Note that
other factors may have contributed to De Beers's recent change in
strategy, including the increase of competitors and the ever-changing
political conditions in diamond rich African nations. See The Diamond
- Cartel The Cartel Isn't For Ever, supra note 9, at 60-2.
119 Wilke, De Beers is in Talks, supra note 23, at AI.120 id.
121 Id. After DeBeers hired a consulting company to review its
finances and market strategies, it reduced its stockpile by a fourth.
CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 134.
122 Wilke, De Beers is in Talks, supra note 23, at Al. In the
past four years, De Beers has made significant changes in its business
strategy. See id De Beers contracted with LVMH Moet Hennessy
Louis Vuitton SA of Paris to establish a retail outlet. Id
De Beers and the Kimberley Process
Answering U.S. criminal charges is proving to be an
important move for the company as it signals an about-face
in its current business strategy with respect to the United
States. Having settled the antitrust charges, the company
can now legally advertise directly in the U.S. and will gain
more convenient access to U.S. consumers. 123 However,
De Beers also faces substantial risks in accepting
jurisdiction in the U.S. Most significantly, by reentering
the U.S. legally, De Beers faces the likelihood of additional
litigation. 124 The company currently faces several private
antitrust suits which have been filed in the U.S., and it
could face additional antitrust suits in the near future. 125
Even in the light of future litigation, one journalist mused,
"[t]he company has apparently decided that it is worth the
legal risk to regain direct access to its largest market."'
126
D. Effectiveness of the Kimberley Process
On the conflict diamond issue, the Kimberley
Process has required De Beers to change its practices
dramatically. Although for years De Beers had failed to
thwart the conflict diamond trade, upon introduction of the
Kimberley Process, the corporation has begun to comply
123 See Margaret Webb Pressler, De Beers Pleads to Price-
Fixing, WASH. POST, July 14, 2004, at El; Williams, supra note 8, at
79.
124 John 1. Wilke, De Beers to Pay $10 Million Fine, Ending
Price-Fixing Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., July 14,2004, at A10.
'23 See Wilke, De Beers is in Talks, supra note 23, at Al. See,
e.g., Leider v. Ralfe, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15345 (S.D.N.Y. July 30,
2004).
126 Wilke, De Beers is in Talks, supra note 23, at Al. More
positively, De Beers executives will have the freedom to travel more
freely within the U.S., which will allow for a renewed presence that
could ultimately lead to a more aggressive marketing campaign
directed toward U.S. consumers. See The Diamond Cartel- The Cartel
Isn't For Ever, supra note 9, at 60.
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fully with a host of self-regulatory provisions that strive to
completely ban the mining and trade of conflict
diamonds.' 2 7 Additionally, De Beers has since announced
its intentions to better scrutinize the origins of its diamonds
and to certify that all De Beers diamonds are conflict-
free.' 28 Although the Kimberley Process was intended to
stem the conflict diamond trade, it has also indirectly
contributed to De Beers's reentry into the U.S. market,
necessitating a guilty plea for past antitrust violations and
future compliance with U.S. regulations. It was not until
the presence of the Kimberley Process's public and
corporate co-regulatory initiative that De Beers chose to
comply with U.S. antitrust laws and submit to U.S.
jurisdiction.
129
When the U.S. issued antitrust, charges against De
Beers in 1994, the company chose to ignore them and was
still able to build its empire and increase profits
exponentially without altering its business practices.'
30
Without the international community's support or some
form of self-regulation, the U.S. was free to issue charges,
but powerless to enforce its antitrust regulations because of
the global extent of De Beers's business. 13  The Kimberly
Process has allowed for the involvement of multiple players
in an industry once controlled by a single corporation's
127 See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra note
70.
128 NEiL BEHRMANN & ROBERT BLOCK, DE BEERS TOABANDON
MONOPOLY, AiM AT NEW ROLE IN DMONDS, Wall St. J., July 13, 2000,
at A20. Some have even suggested that De Beers' reentry into .the U.S.
diamond market and its renewed presence may cause for increased
Department of Justice control over the corporation, and potentially to
its demise. See Dwyer, supra note 94, at AI5 ("Once the department
lets De Beers in, it may finally be able to take the company down.").
129 See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 95, 98 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 8 1-105 and accompanying text.
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interests, and has brought the international scrutiny that has
signaled to De Beers it would no longer be able to operate
behind the closed doors of foreign countries. De Beers's
experience with the Kimberley Process reveals that
industry-wide public and corporate co-regulatory schemes,
acting in concert with national and international
regulations, may be more effective than national laws when
dealing with multinational corporations similar to De
Beers.
Both the institution of the Kimberley Process and
the criminal charges brought against De Beers may prove
to threaten the company's prior hegemony within the
industry; however they may also likely encourage the
company to review its strategies which may ultimately
cause it to place more emphasis on consumers."' Although
it appears that the antitrust charges alone proved ineffective
in inducing the company to change its behavior, 33 the way
in which the company dealt with the U.S. charges suggests
that when dealing with large, multinational companies,
domestic legal action may not prove effective in coercing
such companies to alter their corporate behaviors. Indeed,
when De Beers ultimately pled guilty, this corresponded
with a number of changed circumstances within the
diamond industry, including the increase of competitors
132 Wilke, De Beers is in Talks, supra note 23, at Al ("De
Beers's efforts to transform itself began in the late 1990s after a
strategic review by U.S. management consultants Bain & Co. With De
Beers's share of diamond production slipping and the cost of
maintaining its stockpile rising, Bain recommended that De Beers
abandon its role as industry enforcer and boost demand for diamonds
by burnishing the De Beers brand name."). See also Montpelier, supra
note 25.
3 See supra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
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and, most notably, the institution of the Kimberley Process
as a public and corporate co-regulatory initiative.134
Professor Haufler theorizes that industry self-
regulation is likely to be successful when there is a threat of
national or international regulation, international activism
threatens the industry's reputation, and product image is a
crucial component of that industry's marketability.' 3  The
case of De Beers bears out her theory, but also suggests that
heterogeneous regulatory schemes may be effective in
generally bringing multinational companies within the
ambit of domestic laws.
III. PROPOSAL
A. The Kimberley Process and Conflict Diamonds
By following through with its plan to impose
sanctions on non-complying countries, 136the Kimberley
Process has indicated to the world that it has the ability to
exert real control over the diamond industry and its key
134 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. The 1990s saw
the entry of new competition who were unwilling to play by De Beers's
old unchallenged rules. See The Diamond Cartel - The Cartel Isn't For
Ever, supra note 9, at 61 (explaining that De Beers's "ability to control
world supplies is dwindling."); Wilke, De Beers is in Talks, supra note
23, at Al (Russia, Canada, and Australia have become diamond
producers, "gradually loosening the De Beers cartel's grip on global
diamond supply and pricing,"). See also CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at
133, 135 (crediting De Beers's loss of control over the industry to the
discovery of diamond fields in Canada following a 1999 diamond
rush); KANFER, supra note 1, at 369 (identifying diamonds discovered
in Yakutia, Siberia as a threat to De Beers); The Diamond Cartel - The
Cartel Isn't For Ever, supra note 9, at 61-2 (discussing Lev Leviev's, a
main competitor of DeBeers increased presence in the industry).
1 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing
the Kimberley processing expelling Congo-Brazzaville).
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players. In fact, statistics indicate that the Kimberley
Process may already be lowering the incidence of illegally
smuggled diamonds, thus benefiting the nations where they
originate. In Sierra Leone, official diamond exports almost
doubled in 2004 from the previous year, totaling a taxable
income of $126 million.'" For proponents of the
Kimberley Process, this marked a vast improvement and
signaled its success. The recently-published Diamond
Industry Annual Review for Sierra Leone explained that the
Kimberley Process is largely responsible for the increase in
diamonds traveling through legitimate channels: "[h]ardly
anyone, including government officials, attributes (the rise
in diamond exports) to internal curbs on illicit diamonds
mining and smuggling, both of which continue to
thrive."' 38 Although Kimberley Process participants and
observers would like to see the end of smuggled diamonds
entirely, the early signs of the program's success are
encouraging. Such success may further indicate that the
Kimberley Process has the ability to remedy the one hurdle
that has plagued the international community in its past
attempts to address the conflict diamond problem - the lack
of an enforcement mechanism.
39
In order to ensure it attains its goal of eliminating
the conflict diamond trade, the Kimberley Process will
137 Diamonds Shine Brighter, supra note 22.
13s Id An increase in legal diamonds has multiple benefits for
Sierra Leone, a nation ravaged by war, including increased taxable
wealth and improvement of the nations' foreign exchange reserves. Id.
139 See Maggi, supra note 47, at 545 (suggesting that the
implementation of the Kimberley Process is encouraging because the
international community's support indicates that it has become a global
priority to end the trade in conflict diamonds). See also GLOBAL
WITNESS & PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, supra note 45, at 1
(positing that the establishment of an "auditable trail" standard for
diamonds from mine to export location is essential to the Kimberley
Process's success).
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need to take the further step of closely monitoring diamond
producing countries to ensure that countries such as Congo-
Brazzaville do not bypass the process and find ways to
smuggle illegal diamonds into the world market. Such a
step will require serious dedication, as it is the countries
themselves who are kem players in enforcing the Kimberley
Process's regulations.
For the Kimberley Process to be successful and slip
permanently into the place of hegemony that De Beers once
held in the industry, it will need to demonstrate a sincere
willingness to follow through on the obligations it has
imposed. Though a country may issue regulations, the
factor predictive of success is whether the regulations can
be enforced. 14 1  Therefore, it will be necessary for the
Kimberley Process to ensure that countries such as Congo-
Brazzaville are unable to gain access to the buyers of rough
diamonds, and also that such buyers, of their own accord,
refuse to trade with such countries. There may be a
significant temptation for low-paid officials to issue false
certificates for diamonds being illegally imported or
exported, especially in impoverished nations.14 2  As such,
individual nations should remain vigilant in ensuring that
their officials not succumb to the bribery and corruption
140 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra note 70.
Some critics have been skeptical of diamond certification as a method
for eliminating conflict diamonds, as one such critic has suggested that
the plan is highly unworkable. See CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 132-3
(suggesting that the necessary level of organization and honesty in the
industry is impossible and predicting that foreign customs agents will
be susceptible to bribes in exchange for false certification papers).
141 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing
antitrust charges filed against De Beers, the company's subsequent
withdrawal from the U.S., and the Department of Justice's inability to
enforce adVjudicatory jurisdiction).
"2See Maggi, supra note 47, at 532.
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that would allow such diamonds to change hands
illegally.
143
B.. Lessons from De Beers
Arguably, the Kimberley Process has proven to be
the most successful attempt to solve compliance and human
rights issues in the diamond industry. The diamond
industry's dependence on its product's image undoubtedly
induced De Beers to align itself with U.S and international
trade, antitrust laws, and human rights objectives. It is also
possible that a heterogeneous approach, similar to that of
the Kimberley Process, would prove successful in changing
the practices of similar industries, whose corporate
reputations are of the utmost importance.
Globalization among industries is unlikely to slow,
a reality that presents new problems for nations attempting
to catch companies in their regulatory and judicial hands
before those companies slip into the boundaries of more
143 See, e.g., Amanda Bryant Banat, Note, Solving the Problem
of Conflict Diamonds in Sierra Leone: Proposed Market Theories and
International Legal Requirements for Certification of Origin, 19 ARIZ.
J. INT'L & COMI. L. 939, 974 (2002) (suggesting that the U.S. has a
particular responsibility to answer to citizens of nations torn by
diamond-fueled war, and must heavily monitor diamond imports). In a
report prepared by Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada
(organizations primarily involved in lobbying for the elimination of
conflict diamonds), the organizations made specific recommendations
as to how each of the seven major diamond producing, importing, and
trading countries should ensure that conflict diamonds do not enter or
exit their borders. GLOBAL WITNESS & PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA,
supra note 45; see 'generally Diamonds and Human Security,
http://www.pacweb.org/e/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=3
8&itemid=61 (last visited Feb. 28, 2006); Summary of Conflict
Diamond Campaign,
http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/diamonds/ (last visited Feb.
28, 2006).
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lenient nations. Future scholarship will be needed in order
to examine the extent to which public and corporate co-
regulatory schemes might be utilized to better increase
regulatory compliance of multinational corporations. Such
scholarship should focus its efforts on evaluating the
usefulness of implementing heterogeneous regulatory
bodies such as the Kimberley Process when attempting to
secure regulatory compliance from other global industries
that also rely heavily on reputation.
CONCLUSION
Prior to the implementation of the Kimberley
Process, De Beers was the lone hegemon of the diamond
industry, wielding' control over diamond supply and
demand internationally, and shielding the operations of the
diamond trade beneath a cloak of secrecy. 144  The
corporation could not be compelled to conform its business
practices to U.S. antitrust laws even in light of criminal
sanctions.1 45 It chose to abandon direct operations in the
U.S. rather than answer to the charges. 146 However, with
the creation of the Kimberley Process, an enhanced self-
regulatory scheme involving a heterogeneous group of
industry stakeholders, the company has begun to change its
operations. 47  It is now currently complying with the
regulations intended to eliminate conflict diamonds and, in
participating in the process, has submitted to legal
enforcement.' 8 The Kimberley Process is likely to be
144 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (explaining
De Beers's structure and place within the industry).4 s See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text
(discussing changes De Beers has recently made in its business
structure).
148 See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text
(explaining De Beers's participation in the Kimberley Process).
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highly successful in reducing the proliferation of conflict
diamonds and also may positively affect the diamond
industry as a whole.149 In fact, most evidence indicates that
De Beers has already lost most of its industry hegemony to
the more democratic Kimberley Process, which will
hopefully allow for increased competition in the diamond
industry. With more control over De Beers, hopefully
buyers will be free to negotiate prices in a competitive,
transparent market where a diamond's true origin is more
readily ascertainable.
50
The marked difference in the way De Beers has
responded to various attempts at regulation indicates that an
enhanced self-regulation scheme may be more effective
than unilateral action in inducing large, multinational
corporations to change their corporate practices.'
5'
Furthermore, De Beers' involvement in the Kimberley
Process's enhanced self-regulatory process suggests that
when reputation is a significant part of an industry, as
argued by Professor Haufler, multinational corporations are
149 One report seems to suggest that other industry concerns
form an additional impetus for key players to alter practices. See
GLOBAL WrrNEss, supra note 4, at 6 (identifying industry concerns
about competition from synthetic diamonds and the synthetic filling of
imperfections as one reason for the industry's willingness to certify
natural diamonds).
1' In anticipation of Valentine's Day 2006, journalist Ron
Lieber advised consumers to avoid purchasing conflict diamonds and
predicted that increased celebrity publicity, such as that from rapper
Kanye West's Grammy-nominated "Diamonds from Sierra Leone" and
actor Leonardo DiCaprio's upcoming "Blood Diamond," would bring
the conflict diamond issue to the public's view. See Ron Lieber,
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: 'Conflict Diamonds' Emerge - but
Should You Believe M7l, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2006, at B 1.
151 See supra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.
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more likely to join self-regulation or public and corporate
co-regulatory schemes and comply with their policies. 
152
152 See supra notes 1 14-117 and accompanying text (outlining
Professor Haufler's theory and how De Beers's actions indicate that she
may be correct).


